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A real-estate developer seeks expedited environmental review of a 
proposed real estate project.  When the matter comes before the lo-
cal government, a local official opposes the developer’s request for 
expedited review.  At the time this matter is pending, the official’s 
spouse is seeking payment for work she had performed for the de-
veloper’s overseas affiliate on an unrelated matter.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Every day, all across the country, local and state governmental en-
tities face a myriad of ethical issues and decisions.  These entities set 
up rules and regulations, and the elected officials in these jurisdictions 
are accountable to their voters for establishing and maintaining ethi-
cal rules and standards.  In the news story outlined above, one such 
official may have overstepped ethical bounds and, if so, violated a 
state ethics rule that subjects the official to a $5000 regulatory fine.  
But, if the official used the United States mail in connection with this 
matter, proposed legislation before Congress would render that offi-
cial guilty of a federal offense and subject to a possible twenty years 
in federal prison.2  If we multiply this story by many thousands, then 
 
 1. See Garrett Therolf, Supervisor’s Wife Was Owed $200,000 by an AEG Affil-
iate When He Voted on a Measure About Stadium Plans, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, 
at A4. 
 2. The Clean Up Government Act of 2011,” H.R. 2572, 111th Cong. (2011).  The 
relevant text is contained in the Appendix. See infra pp. 339–41.  An earlier version 
was introduced as the “Honest Services Restoration Act,” S. 3854, 111th Cong. 
(2010).  As this Article goes to press, competing versions of this bill are still pending 
before Congress.  The Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 
112th Cong. (2011), was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 28, 
2011. 157 CONG. REC. S5017 (daily ed. July 28, 2011) (reports of committees).  The 
Clean Up Government Act of 2011, H.R. 2572 (2011) was reported out of the House 
Judiciary Committee on December 1, 2011.  157 CONG. REC. D1303 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 
2011) (miscellaneous measures).  In addition, there is a third bill, Restore Public 
Trust Act, H.R. 4054, 112th Cong. (2012), introduced after unsuccessful attempts 
were made to pass the text of S. 401 and H.R. 2572 in other bills.  These other bills 
include the STOCK Act, which prohibits insider trading by members of Congress.  
The honest services language was ultimately omitted from that bill.  See Press Re-
lease, Congresswoman Louise M. Slaughter, After Six Years, Slaughter’s Work to 
End Insider Trading in Congress Will Become Law (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.louise.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2689:
after-six-years-slaughters-work-to-end-insider-trading-in-congress-will-become-
law&catid=101:2012-press-releases&Itemid=55 (stating that public corruption prose-
cution improvements were left out of the STOCK Act).  See Slaughter Claims 
STOCK Victory, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Mar. 23, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 
6214369 (stating that public corruption prosecution improvements were left out of 
the STOCK Act). 
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we may start to feel that there is something seriously wrong with this 
picture. 
The underlying disease is the United States Congress’s attempt, 
over the last forty years, to expand federal power to prosecute an ev-
er-broader array of crimes.3  In a case arising out of the notorious En-
ron financial fraud scandal, the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Skilling at last confronted one of the most egregious 
such crimes—federal “honest services” fraud.4  In its decision, the 
Court narrowed the statute’s reach in order to avoid holding the stat-
ute unconstitutionally vague.5 
With its decision partially striking down the federal honest services 
fraud statute in the criminal case against former Enron CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling, the United States Supreme Court took a modest step to 
combat the trend towards the proliferation of overly-broad federal 
criminal statutes.  Such laws are often passed—or existing laws ex-
panded by prosecutors—in the midst of financial or political scandal, 
when the government needs to appear to be “doing something.”6  The 
government faces pressure to produce criminal charges whenever 
there is a perceived scandal or crisis, whether it is the recent financial 
sector melt-down or the Enron-era financial scandals.  Many of these 
laws are passed quickly and with little thought or deliberation, pro-
ducing the synergistic crises of overcriminalization7 and 
overfederalization.8 
 
 3. See J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment—Reflections on 
Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 48–49 & nn.17–21 
(2007) [hereinafter Strader, White Collar Crime].  
 4. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).  Although recently decided, the Skilling decision has 
already generated a substantial amount of commentary.  For commentary written be-
fore the decision was issued, see Nancy J. King, Introduction: Skilling v. United 
States, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1 (2010); Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services 
Fraud:  A (Vague) Threat to Millions of Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) 
American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 23 (2010).  For more recent com-
mentary, see Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 31 (2010); Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1823 (2011). 
 5. The Court’s opinion does not expressly state that the statute is unconstitu-
tionally vague, only that the statute might be interpreted as such without the limita-
tion imposed by the Court. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933. 
 6. See Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 3, at 52 (“[T]he explosions of 
creative, aggressive white collar prosecutions tend to come in cycles.  Not surprising-
ly, these waves tend to coincide with political pressure on the government to address 
areas of public concern.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Mor-
als and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005) [here-
inafter Beale, Many Faces].  For one recent example of overcriminalization, see Orin 
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This trend has the potential to affect the criminal justice system in 
basic ways.  Most fundamentally, under the U.S. Constitution’s Due 
Process Clause,9 we all have a right to know what conduct is criminal 
and what conduct is not.  But the rush to criminalization has pro-
duced laws that no one—not even members of the U.S. Supreme 
Court—can understand.  As Justice Scalia famously noted about the 
federal racketeering (RICO) statute, the definition of one of the 
crime’s key elements is about as clear as “life is a fountain.”10  Such 
statutes provide prosecutors with largely unfettered discretion in 
bringing cases based upon novel, untested theories.11  And to the ex-
tent that Congress has played the overcriminalization game, we have 
had a dramatic intrusion of federal law enforcement authority into 
areas usually reserved for state and local prosecutors.12 
Where have the courts been during this overcriminalization crisis?  
Strangely absent.  Courts have been hesitant to interfere with the leg-
islative process by overturning criminal statutes.  Even the U.S. Su-
preme Court has rarely invalidated criminal laws on the grounds that 
the laws are vague and incomprehensible. 
Once again, in the Skilling case, the Court declined to find the 
criminal statute unconstitutionally vague.13  Instead, the six member 
majority simply decided to rewrite the statute so that it only applies to 
bribery and kickbacks—even though those words appear nowhere in 
the statute.14  In reaching this result, the Court opened itself to criti-
cism from both sides.  For some, including Justice Scalia in concur-
rence,15 the Court had exceeded its power by rewriting the honest 
services statute and thereby acting as a sort of super-legislative body.  
 
S. Kerr, Should Faking a Name on Facebook Be a Felony?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 
2011, at A15. 
 8. See, e.g., Beale, Many Faces, supra note 7, at 768.  
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 10. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 11. Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0:  The Symbiotic Relationship Be-
tween Plea Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 653 
(2011).  Because of the prevalence of plea bargaining, many of these novel theories 
are never tested in court. Id. at 649. 
 12. Many have commented on the overcriminalization phenomenon. See, e.g., 
Beale, Many Faces, supra note 7, at 748. 
 13. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 (2010). 
 14. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931. 
 15. In a concurring opinion joined by two other members of the Court, Justice 
Scalia said that the Court should simply have invalidated a law that is so vague that it 
cannot be understood.  The concurring justices would have found the statute invalid 
and left it to Congress to remedy the problem.  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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Under this view, the Court should have voided the statute in its en-
tirety.  For others, the Court had overstepped its bounds by taking a 
powerful anti-corruption tool away from prosecutors.16  Under this 
view, the Court should have upheld the statute without modification. 
This Article provides a soft defense of the Skilling decision, and a 
critique of Congress’s proposed response to the decision.17  The Arti-
cle argues that the honest services statute indeed created a vague 
crime that failed to provide fair notice to potential defendants or to 
cabin prosecutors’ discretion.18  But, in light of Congress’s complicity 
in creating the overcriminalization and overfederalization crises, the 
Court probably took the best (or least bad) route in attempting to 
provide rational boundaries for honest services prosecutions.19 
Part I of this Article traces the background of honest services 
fraud.20  Part II examines the disparate responses to and criticisms of 
the Skilling decision.21  Part III analyzes the Court’s options in Skil-
ling, concluding that the judicial-legislative dynamic, in an environ-
ment rife with overcriminalization and overfederalization, inevitably 
requires courts to attempt to provide some rational limits on our ev-
er-expanding federal criminal laws.22  Part IV provides a preliminary 
analysis of the proposed Congressional response to Skilling, a statute 
that fails to solve the fundamental ambiguities inherent in “honest 
services” fraud and that creates more problems than it solves.23 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD 
Beginning in the 1970s, federal prosecutors increasingly employed 
the honest services theory to pursue corrupt politicians on the 
grounds that those politicians had used the U.S. mails or interstate 
wires to deprive their constituents of “honest services.”24  Among 
those convicted were state governors and many others.25  The theory 
 
 16. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 1823. 
 17. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 18. See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 142–58 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 25–60 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 61–141 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 142–59 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 160–82 and accompanying text. 
 24. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 63–64 (3d 
ed. 2011) [hereinafter STRADER, UNDERSTANDING]. 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1352 (4th Cir. 1979), aff’d on 
reh’g, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979). 
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was also used against private employees who deprived their employ-
ers of “honest services.”26 
A. Prosecutorial Invention of Honest Services Fraud 
Federal prosecutors, the courts, and Congress have all contributed 
to the evolution of the honest services quagmire. It all started in fed-
eral prosecutors’ offices.  In traditional mail or wire fraud cases, the 
government alleges that the defendant schemed to deprive the victim 
of money or property.27  About forty years ago, however, another 
theory came to be widely applied in mail and wire fraud cases—
honest services fraud.  Initially, this theory was a prosecutorially-
created and judicially-approved form of fraud that was not grounded 
in the language or history of the underlying statutes.  The predecessor 
to the current mail fraud statute was adopted in 1872, and the wire 
fraud statute in 1952.28 
In the 1970s, prosecutors began to charge an array of crimes based 
on the theory that the defendants’ schemes were designed to deprive 
the victims of the intangible right to honest services.29  Public officials 
and private persons were charged with honest services mail or wire 
fraud based upon alleged deprivations owed, typically, to public citi-
zens and private employers, respectively.30  In the highest profile cas-
es, the government employed the theory to prosecute state and local 
officials who had allegedly deprived their constituents of the officials’ 
duty to provide the public with honest services.31 
B. The McNally Decision 
Federal courts consistently upheld this new mail and wire fraud 
theory.32  Not surprisingly, the honest services theory produced case 
law that was both inconsistent and difficult to comprehend.  In 
McNally v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned the law in 
all the circuits that had considered the issue and ruled that the honest 
 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 27. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 78–88. 
 28. See Nicholas J. Wagoner, Honest-Services Fraud: The Supreme Court Defus-
es the Government’s Weapon of Mass Discretion in Skilling v. United States, 51 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1092–96 (2010). 
 29. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 85–88. 
 30. See Wagoner, supra note 28, at 1096. 
 31. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 78–79; Wagoner, supra 
note 28, at 1096–97. 
 32. See, e.g., Jason T. Elder, Federal Mail Fraud Unlearned: Revisiting the Crim-
inal Catch-All, 77 OR. L. REV. 707, 714 n.33 (1998). 
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services fraud theory is invalid.33  Instead, the Court held, a mail or 
wire fraud case must be based upon proof that the defendant intend-
ed to deprive the victim of money or property.34  In McNally, a Ken-
tucky state official participated in a kickback scheme involving state 
insurance providers.35  The case was brought solely on the theory that 
the state and its citizens lost their right to the public officials’ honest 
services; the government did not allege or prove that the scheme was 
designed to deprive the victims of money or property.36 
The Supreme Court rejected the honest services theory on two 
grounds.  Initially, the Court focused on the language of the statutes, 
which criminalize “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses . . . .”37  
The Court rejected the argument that the “money or property” re-
quirement only applies to the false or fraudulent pretenses prong of 
the statute.38  The Court further found that Congress intended to in-
corporate the common law of fraud, which requires a scheme to de-
prive a victim or money or property.39 
C. The Honest Services Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 
Congress responded quickly to McNally.40  The year after the 
McNally decision, Congress passed a law, codified at § 1346, simply 
providing that “[f]or purposes of this Chapter, the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of 
the intangible right of honest services.”41  That is the entirety of the 
statute.  This law was simply tacked on to an unrelated bill without 
 
 33. 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987).  For a recent, highly publicized case, see United 
States v. Blagojevich, 594 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 34. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358–59.  
 35. Id. at 352–53. 
 36. Id. at 352. 
 37. Id. at 352 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1948)). 
 38. Id. at 356–58.  The Court in McNally based its conclusion on the legislative 
history.  The Court found that the false pretenses language was added to make clear 
that the mail fraud statute should reach future frauds, as the Court had held in 
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).  
 39. Id. at 359 n.8. 
 40. One member of Congress stated that the law “restores the mail [and wire] 
fraud provision[s] to where [they were] before the McNally decision.” 134 CONG. 
REC. H11, 108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (alteration to 
the original in the quoted text).  However, even after § 1346 was enacted, McNally 
continued to operate to limit prosecutions involving intangible property interests. See 
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 20 (2000) (holding that fraudulent schemes 
to obtain licenses and permits do not fall within the mail and wire fraud statutes). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994). 
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any meaningful legislative history.42  Congress passed the statute as 
part of a narcotics bill, and the honest services statute was never dis-
cussed or debated.43  The statute does not define “honest services” 
fraud, a task that was left principally to prosecutors and secondarily 
to courts. 
As many others have recounted, the honest services statute pro-
duced a morass of case law with contradictory interpretations of the 
statute.44  The Court in Skilling described this confusion, stating, 
“courts have disagreed about whether § 1346 prosecutions must be 
based on a violation of state law, whether a defendant must contem-
plate that the victim suffer economic harm, and whether the defend-
ant must act in pursuit of private gain.”45  The courts had also been 
conflicted over whether pre-§ 1346 law was relevant when interpret-
ing the honest services statute.46 
 
 42. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)); see United States v. Brumley, 
116 F.3d 728, 746–47 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
 43. Brumley, 116 F.3d at 743 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
 44. Justice Scalia, in his Skilling concurrence, described with characteristic flair 
the uncertain boundaries of honest services fraud: 
The possibilities range from any action that is contrary to public policy or 
otherwise immoral, to only the disloyalty of a public official or employee to 
his principal, to only the secret use of a perpetrator’s position of trust in or-
der to harm whomever he is beholden to. The duty probably did not have to 
be rooted in state law, but maybe it did. It might have been more demand-
ing in the case of public officials, but perhaps not. At the time § 1346 was 
enacted there was no settled criterion for choosing among these options, for 
conclusively settling what was in and what was out. 
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2938 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice 
Scalia had earlier provided a more detailed critique of the statute. See Sorich v. Unit-
ed States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1309–10 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiora-
ri). 
 45. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 n.36.  As one court noted: 
The relationship between state law and the federal honest services statute is 
unsettled.  The Fifth Circuit has held that section 1346 extends only to con-
duct that independently violates state law.  Other circuits have denied that 
state law plays any necessary role.  It is plain that sections 1341 and 1346 
enact a federal crime—but beyond that, broad generalizations may be un-
safe.   
United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 298 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 46. Compare United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogat-
ed by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc), with Rybicki, 
354 F.3d at 143.  The Court in Skilling expressly relied upon pre-McNally cases.  See 
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933–34.  See generally STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 
24, at 86–87. 
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D. The Skilling Decision 
Twenty-two years after Congress enacted § 1346, the Court in Skil-
ling finally confronted the meaning and constitutionality of the honest 
services statute.47  The Skilling case arose from the facts leading to 
2001 bankruptcy of Enron.  The government charged Jeffrey Skilling, 
Enron’s former CEO, and others with a massive fraud case in connec-
tion with Enron’s demise.48  At his trial, the jury convicted Skilling of 
conspiracy, mail fraud under the honest services theory, and securities 
fraud.49  The Court granted certiorari on two honest-services related 
issues: whether an honest services fraud scheme must include an in-
tended private gain from the scheme’s victim and whether the honest 
services statute is unconstitutionally vague.50 
Many commentators had hoped that the Court would use the Skil-
ling case as an opportunity either to invalidate the honest services 
statute in its entirety or to provide a comprehensive and coherent 
construct of the statute.51  The Court did neither.  Reversing Skilling’s 
honest services conviction, the Court declined to invalidate the stat-
ute as unconstitutionally vague.52  Instead, the Court purported to 
survey honest services case law in order to divine the meaning of the 
term “honest services.”53  The Court found that the “‘vast majority’ of 
the honest-services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fi-
duciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes . . . . Con-
gress’s reversal of McNally and reinstatement of the honest-services 
doctrine, we conclude, can and should be salvaged by confining its 
scope to the core pre-McNally applications . . . .”54  The Court contin-
ued: 
there is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to reach at least 
bribes and kickbacks.  Reading the statute to proscribe a wider 
 
 47. In 2009, the Court granted certiorari in Skilling and two other honest services 
cases.  In the first honest service case, the issue was whether an honest services viola-
tion must be based upon an underlying state law violation.  United States v. 
Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (2008).  In the second honest service case, the issue 
was whether the honest services fraud scheme must be designed to cause harm to the 
intended victim of the scheme.  Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2965 (2010).  
The Court vacated and remanded both of those cases for reconsideration in light of 
Skilling. Black, 130 S. Ct. at 2970; Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1248. 
 48. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2900. 
 49. Id. at 2901. 
 50. Id. at 2912. 
 51. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 4, at 43. 
 52. Skilling , 130 S. Ct. at 2933. 
 53. Id. at 2928–31. 
 54. Id. at 2930–31. 
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range of offensive conduct, we acknowledge, would raise the due 
process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine . . . .  [W]e now 
hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the 
pre-McNally case law.55 
In a footnote, the Court practically dared Congress to attempt to en-
act a broader honest services statute that would withstand a vague-
ness challenge.56 
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, three concurring justices 
concluded that § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague and should have 
been held invalid in its entirety in Skilling’s case.57  The concurring 
justices also criticized the Court for overstepping its bounds by essen-
tially creating a new federal crime that appears nowhere in the stat-
ute.58 
II.  THE REACTION TO SKILLING 
Although there were many disparate reactions to the Skilling deci-
sion, one common response was surprise.59  The Court’s decision was 
rooted neither in precedent nor in the statute’s legislative history or 
 
 55. Id. at 2931. 
 56. Responding to arguments made in the government’s brief, the Court wrote: 
If Congress were to take up the enterprise of criminalizing “undisclosed 
self-dealing by a public official or private employee,” it would have to em-
ploy standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due 
process concerns.  The government proposes a standard that prohibits the 
“taking of official action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed 
financial interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom 
he owes a fiduciary duty,” so long as the employee acts with a specific intent 
to deceive and the undisclosed conduct could influence the victim to change 
its behavior.  That formulation, however, leaves many questions unan-
swered. How direct or significant does the conflicting financial interest have 
to be?  To what extent does the official action have to further that interest 
in order to amount to fraud?  To whom should the disclosure be made and 
what information should it convey?  These questions and others call for par-
ticular care in attempting to formulate an adequate criminal prohibition in 
this context. 
Id. at 2933 n.44 (citations omitted). 
 57. Justice Scalia argued that the statute should have been held invalid on an as-
applied basis, but that the decision would limit future prosecutions under the statute 
because of stare decisis. Id. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]n transforming the prohibition of ‘hon-
est-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and kick-backs’ [the majority] is 
wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal crimes.”) (al-
teration to the original in the quoted text). 
 59. Buell, supra note 4, at 43. 
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language.60  In this light, the decision was vulnerable to attack from 
all sides, ranging from those who believe that honest services fraud 
provides prosecutors with an important route for attacking public and 
private malfeasance to those who believe that “honest services” is a 
fatally vague crime subject to prosecutorial abuse.61  Others, including 
the concurring justices, believe that the new version of the crime 
leaves many questions unanswered and is nearly as vague as the old 
one.62  Finally, some fault the Court for not using the opportunity to 
provide a comprehensive theory of the law of fraud.63  This Section 
analyzes and responds to the principal criticisms of the Skilling deci-
sion.64 
A. A Broad Honest Services Fraud Statute is Not a Necessary or 
Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Public and Private 
Malfeasance 
Many have argued that a broad honest services statute provides a 
necessary anti-corruption tool by supplementing existing laws.65  The 
 
 60. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Among all the pre-
McNally smorgasbord-offerings of varieties of honest-services fraud, not one is lim-
ited to bribery and kickbacks.  That is a dish the Court has cooked up all on its 
own”); see also id. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Until today, no one has thought 
(and there is no basis for thinking) that the honest-services statute prohibited only 
bribery and kickbacks.”). 
 61. See Buell, supra note 4, at 32. 
 62. The concurrence argued that limiting “honest services” fraud to bribes and 
kickbacks: 
would not suffice to eliminate the vagueness of the statute.  It would solve 
(perhaps) the indeterminacy of what acts constitute a breach of the “honest 
services” obligation under the pre-McNally law.  But it would not solve the 
most fundamental indeterminacy:  the character of the “fiduciary capacity” 
to which the bribery and kickback restriction applies.  Does it apply only to 
public officials?  Or in addition to private individuals who contract with the 
public?  Or to everyone, including the corporate officer here?  The pre-
McNally case law does not provide an answer.  Thus, even with the bribery 
and kickback limitation the statute does not answer the question “What is 
the criterion of guilt?” 
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2938–39 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 63. See Buell, supra note 4, at 43. 
 64. See infra Part II.A–D. 
 65. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
251, 259 (2010) [hereinafter Beale, Honest Services] (Congress “enacted § 1346 in 
order to cast a wider prosecutorial net.”); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Criminalizing the De-
nial of Honest Services After Skilling, 11 WIS. L. REV. 27, 52 (2011) (advocating a 
Congressional response to Skilling); Jennifer I. Rowe, Comment, The Future of 
Honest Services Fraud, 74 ALB. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2010–2011) (positing that fed-
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usual reasons are lack of resources and potential political interference 
at the state and local level.66  In the story discussed at the beginning of 
this Article, a local official may have been guilty of violating state eth-
ics rules.67  In one of the cases in which the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari along with Skilling,68 a state legislator apparently violated 
state ethics rules by failing to disclose a more direct conflict of inter-
est.69  Such cases, some argue, are important crimes that should be 
prosecuted at the federal level. 
The response is that rendering such acts federal crimes subject to 
substantial prison time throws our federal system out of whack in a 
myriad of ways.70  On the federal side, do we want our limited re-
sources to be used to prosecute individual violations of state and local 
ethics rules?  The risk of politically retributive charges is simply too 
great,71 and the use of resources suspect.  On the state and local side, 
would federal intrusion remove the incentive to self-police such viola-
tions?72 
Yes, on occasion, local law enforcement agencies may be too en-
twined with local politics to be able to do the job effectively.  And in 
cases of large-scale corruption, the balance might tip towards federal 
involvement.  In such cases, however, it is almost inconceivable that 
the corrupt officials have not violated federal law more directly appli-
 
eral intervention is necessary in both public and private sector state and local fraud 
cases). 
 66. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 65, at 438. 
 67. See supra note 1. 
 68. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (2008), vacated, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 69. Id. at 1239–40. 
 70. See Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 260 (“[I]t’s the federal govern-
ment setting the standards for good government on the part of state and local offi-
cials.  That’s a terrible idea.”). 
 71. For a highly-publicized case, consider the prosecution of former Alabama 
governor Don Siegelman, who was charged with various crimes, including honest ser-
vices fraud.  For the latest decision in this ongoing saga, see United States v. 
Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011).  For additional background to this contro-
versial case, which many consider to have been politically motivated, see John 
Schwartz, Judges Take Another Look at Ex-Alabama Governor’s Conviction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A16. 
 72. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Lo-
cal Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 712 (1999) (arguing that the overfederalization of 
criminal law has had the effect of consolidating power in the federal government at 
the expense of the states); Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 265 (arguing that 
the threat of the rare federal prosecution may reduce incentives for state and local 
governments to clean up their own houses); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: 
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172–74 
(1995) (arguing that overfederalization damages state and local law enforcement). 
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cable to their actions.  State bribery laws, for example, are RICO 
predicates.73  The federal extortion statute applies to state and local 
officials who use the power of their office to extract bribes.74  If the 
feds need to get involved because of enforcement barriers at the local 
level, then they will almost surely have a way to do so without resort-
ing to a vague, concocted crime such as honest services fraud.  With 
respect to corrupt federal officials, the wide reach of extortion, brib-
ery, and gratuities statutes covers the gamut of serious wrongdoing.75 
All in all, in a substantial majority of cases, any serious corruption 
scheme will fall within of the ambit of one or more federal criminal 
statutes.  For federal public officials, these are, explicitly, anti-
corruption statutes.  Some argue the high-profile state and local cor-
ruption cases, such as that against former Illinois governor Rod 
Blagojevich, demonstrate the need for the honest services statute.76  
Yet, in the vast majority of these cases, an honest services charge is 
unnecessary. 
The Blagojevich case provides a telling example.  The government 
charged that he committed a number of crimes, including federal pro-
gram bribery, false statements, and extortion, arising out of his at-
tempt to sell President Obama’s senate seat.77  The indictment also 
included a RICO charge, with federal law extortion and state law 
 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006). 
 74. Id. § 1951.  The leading Supreme Court cases interpreting this statute in the 
public corruption context are McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), and 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).  For criticism of the broad reading of the 
statute utilized in the Evans decision, see Thomas A. Secrest, Criminal Law: Bribery 
Equals Extortion: The Supreme Court Refuses to Make Inducement a Necessary El-
ement of Extortion “Under Color of Official Right” Under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(b): Evans v. United States, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 251, 277 (1993) (“The 
courts’ expansion of the Hobbs Act, as evidenced in Evans, results in granting federal 
prosecutors ‘virtually unlimited discretion to define both the meaning of the Hobbs 
Act as well as whom it should reach.’”).  
 75. Although the Supreme Court limited the reach of the gratuities statute in 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 409–12 (1999), it has continu-
ally expanded the reach of the federal bribery statutes to cover, for example, remote 
connections to the federal government. See, e.g., Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 
482 (1984). The Supreme Court has exhibited a similar tendency by expanding the 
federal extortion statute to reach receipt of bribes by state and local officials. See, 
e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).  This expanded federal reach has its 
own critics. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 72, at 712; Brickey, supra note 72, at 1172–74; 
Secrest, supra note 74, at 277.  But these statutes, at least, have the virtue of criminal-
izing a defined scope of activities. 
 76. See, e.g., Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 265. 
 77. Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Blagojevich, No. 08 CR888 
(N.D. Ill.), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0204_02a. 
pdf. 
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bribery as the principal predicates.  Blagojevich was convicted of 
those crimes, in addition to honest services fraud.78  The honest ser-
vices fraud charge was therefore simply unnecessary to punish Blago-
jevich for his actions. 
It is true that these other statutes have their own overbreadth prob-
lems.  The RICO statute, for example, itself is notoriously laden with 
unclear terms, such as “pattern” and “enterprise.”79  But RICO pros-
ecutions are limited by Department of Justice policies,80 and the stat-
ute usually is employed to attack wide scale criminal wrongdoing, not 
individual ethics breaches by state and local officials. 
In private sector cases, the Skilling case itself shows the redundan-
cy of the honest services statute.  Skilling’s crime was, fundamentally, 
securities fraud–conspiring to mislead investors into believing that 
Enron was financially sound when in fact the company’s fortunes 
were spiraling downward.81  The federal government has a valid in-
terest in large scale fraud, either because of the far-reaching impact of 
such fraud schemes (like Enron), or because a state or local prosecu-
tor might lack the resources to take on such a case (Enron), or both.82  
Such large-scale fraud will nearly always (and maybe even always) en-
tail other crimes, such as securities fraud, bank fraud, and many other 
crimes.83  Providing prosecutors with the ability to pile on charges, 
perhaps in an effort to coerce a plea, should not be a justification for 
a duplicative federal anti-fraud statute.84  And more mundane fraud 
cases—a store buyer taking a kickback from a supplier, for exam-
ple85—really do not merit federal action; indeed, such cases divert re-
sources from the cases that more urgently require the federal gov-
ernment’s attention. 
 
 78. See Bob Secter & Jeff Coen, Blagojevich on Guilty Verdict: ‘I, Frankly, Am 
Stunned,’ CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-27/ 
news/chi-blagojevich-jurors-going-into-their-10th-day-20110627_1_political-
corruption-crime-spree-abraham-lincoln-roll-new-jury. 
 79. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 321–26, 335–41. 
 80. Id. at 316–17. 
 81. Skilling was convicted of one count of conspiracy, one count of insider trad-
ing, five counts of making false statements to auditors, and twelve counts of securities 
fraud. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2011).  Weyhrauch was 
indicted for honest services fraud. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1243 
(9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  Black was convicted of mail and wire 
fraud in violation of § 1341 and of obstruction of justice in violation of § 1512(c). 
Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2967–68 (2010). 
 82. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 5–7. 
 83. See, e.g., STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 89–93. 
 84. See Dervan, supra note 11, at 645. 
 85. See United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 510–11 (1973).  
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In public sector cases, it is true that the need for a broad anti-
corruption statute may be greater in some ways because of overt and 
subtle conflicts of interest that state and local law enforcement agen-
cies may face when confronted with corruption by state and local offi-
cials with whom the agencies may have close contacts.  But, once 
again, the federal government must face decisions concerning re-
source allocations.  If federal law enforcement addressed all actual 
and potential conflicts of interest, such as the one discussed at the be-
ginning of this Article, then federal prosecutors would have no time 
for anything else. 
In addition, an honest services statute focused on bribes and kick-
backs could have the effect of directing prosecutors’ energy at the 
most egregious cases, leaving less important cases to state and local 
law enforcement and to regulatory agencies.  For example, as one 
commentator has argued in the particular context of health care 
fraud, “while Skilling is widely considered to have narrowed the scope 
of honest services fraud overall, it may turn out to have the paradoxi-
cal effect of inviting additional prosecutions of physicians and others 
in the health care industry.”86  Because kickbacks are such a wide-
spread practice in the health care industry, an honest services fraud 
statute focused on this practice could energize prosecutors to use 
honest services fraud in such cases.87 
Similar benefits could occur in public sector corruption cases.  Lim-
iting honest services fraud to bribes and kickbacks directs the statute 
to the kind of wrongdoing that most directly affects the public’s inter-
ests.  More subtle forms of political self-dealing, including undisclosed 
conflicts of interest, simply appear in too many shades of gray to fall 
comfortably within a single federal criminal fraud statute. 
At a minimum, Congress should recognize that not every instance 
of public malfeasance is appropriately addressed by the criminal law.  
Yes, politicians are eager to appear to be tough on crime, particularly 
where they can appear to be acting to punish their own.  But this mo-
tivation runs the risk of sliding into sanctimonious and ill-considered 
legislation.  Not every shady political dealing should be a crime, for if 
it were prosecutors would have no time to pursue other matters.  And 
not every politician’s crime should be dealt with at the federal level. 
 
 86. Joan H. Krause, Skilling and The Pursuit of Health Care Fraud, 66 U. Miami 
L. Rev. 363, 364–65 (2012). 
 87. Id.  
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B. The Court’s Decision to Narrow Rather Than Void the 
Honest Services Statute Was a Reasonable Response to 
Overcriminalization 
Both the Skilling concurring justices and a number of commenta-
tors have opined that the Court overstepped its bounds in narrowing 
the honest services statute rather than holding the statute void in its 
entirety.  Justice Scalia stated that, “in transforming the prohibition of 
‘honest-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and kick-backs’ 
[the Court] is wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to de-
fine new federal crimes.”88  Others flatly stated that the Court 
“stepped over the separation of powers line.”89 
Although there is a certain purity to this criticism, it ignores reality.  
Courts are frequently confronted with unclear statutes, and a key part 
of a court’s job is to interpret such statutes.  In particular, the United 
States Supreme Court has done this over and over again.90  Given this 
reality, a strict separation of powers doctrine that severely limits judi-
cial statutory interpretation is largely theoretical.  As Professor John 
Jeffries has written, under the traditional view, 
the legislature . . . was the only legitimate institution for enforcing 
societal judgments through the penal law.  Judicial innovation was 
politically illegitimate . . . .  Although doubtless less central than in 
the past, [separation of powers] remains an established feature of 
American political ideology.  As a guide for judicial action in the 
field of criminal law, however, separation of powers is not very help-
ful.91 
Why does Jeffries reach this conclusion?  Because of the problem 
of vague statutes.  Simply put, “interstitial judicial lawmaking is at 
least tolerated and perhaps affirmatively authorized.  More to the 
point, it is inevitable.  Any resolution of statutory ambiguity involves 
judicial choice. The resulting ‘gloss’ on the legislative text is both po-
litically legitimate and institutionally unavoidable.”92 
 
 88. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(alteration in original). 
 89. Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 254 (describing uncertainties post-
Skilling). 
 90. See J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41, 
63 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court frequently interprets federal criminal statutes and 
has created a large body of case law from which to draw basic principles of statutory 
interpretation.”). 
 91. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 202 (1985). 
 92. Id. at 204. 
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In this context, the Skilling concurrence was simply unrealistic in its 
insistence on judicial purity in construing ambiguous statutes.93  The 
Skilling reading of the honest services statute no more constituted 
legislation than did the Court’s reading, for example, of RICO’s “pat-
tern” requirement to mean “continuity plus relationship,”94 an inter-
pretation with which Justice Scalia concurred, albeit reluctantly.95  
There are many similar examples, and so the Skilling critics really are 
crying wolf when complaining that the Court has overstepped its 
bounds. 
C. The Skilling Decision Substantially Reduced the Risks 
Inherent in a Vague Criminal Statute 
One of the most frequent criticisms of Skilling is that it raises as 
many questions as it answers.96  Most significantly perhaps, courts are 
already expressing uncertainty concerning whether honest services 
fraud based on an omission must include proof that the defendant 
owed a fiduciary duty.97  This is one of the most potent criticisms that 
has been leveled at the decision, and it has some validity. 
The Court in Skilling apparently concluded that issues of interpre-
tation would rarely arise under its limited definition of honest ser-
vices.98  The Court was mistaken.99  Many interpretation issues re-
main, including: the definitions of “bribe” and “kickback;” the source 
(state or federal law or statutes) of those definitions;100 whether the 
 
 93. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939. 
 94. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).   
 95. Id. at 251–56 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 96. Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 254; see also Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 
2938–39 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 97. United States v. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d 405, 408–10 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that such a duty is not required).  
 98. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.41 (issues of ambiguity are “rare in bribe and 
kickback cases.  The existence of a fiduciary relationship, under any definition of that 
term, usually [has been] beyond dispute; examples include public official-public, em-
ployee-employer, and union official-union members.”) (citations omitted). 
 99. See, e.g., Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 409; Brief for the United States at 27, Unit-
ed States v. Scanlon, No. 11-3024, 2011 WL 3440447 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 2012) (“[A]t 
no point did Skilling hold that these three fiduciary relationships marked the outer 
boundaries of § 1346”). See generally STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 
87–88. 
 100. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissent-
ing); see United States v. Carbo, 572 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
most obvious form of honest services fraud is outright bribery of a public official); 
Memorandum of Robert Geddie In Support of Motion to Dismiss Count Three (3) 
and Counts Twenty-Three (23) Through Thirty-Three (33) Or In the Alternative, For 
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bribe or kickback must violate the law; whether that law must provide 
for criminal sanctions in order to qualify; whether honest services 
fraud extends beyond public officials and agents of public entities to 
reach private persons; whether, if the statute reaches private persons, 
the same standards apply as for public officials and agents; in the case 
of a private party, whether an intended harm is required and, if so, 
whether economic harm is required or some other sort of harm would 
suffice;101 whether, in a case of undisclosed self-dealing, the govern-
ment could instead argue the deprivation of an intangible property 
right.102 
To understand the uncertainties that courts still must confront 
post-Skilling, take the recent decision in United States v. 
Milovanovic.103  In that case, the defendants were charged in connec-
tion with a bribery scheme involving a state’s issuance of commercial 
drivers’ licenses.  The state hired a company to provide translating 
services in connection with the issuance of those licenses.104  The de-
fendants schemed to take bribes in exchange for assisting particular 
license applicants.105  The defendants moved to dismiss the honest 
services charge, arguing that they owed no fiduciary duty to the victim 
of the scheme, the state.106  The district court agreed and dismissed 
the honest services charges.107  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding that a breach of a fiduciary duty is not required in an honest 
services case.108  In place of this requirement, the court found that an 
honest services case must be based upon “a legally enforceable right 
to have another provide honest services.”109 
 
a Bill of Particulars at 10, United States v. Geddie, 2:10-CR-00186, 2011 WL 2278910 
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 22, 2011) (citing Skilling for the proposition that “§ 1346 criminalizes 
only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law . . . involving public 
officials in terms of under-the-table cash or gratuities.”) (citation omitted) (alteration 
in original).   
 101. See United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 600–02 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 
S. Ct. 2963 (2010), remanded to 625 F.3d 386, 391–92 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing hon-
est services fraud conviction). 
 102. See Dane C. Ball, Repacking Skilling-Barred Fraud Theories: A Form of 
Damage Control that Goes Too Far, 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA) 22, 741 
(2010).  
 103. 627 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 104. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 407. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 407–08. 
 107. Id. at 407. 
 108. Id. at 413. 
 109. Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(Raggi, J., concurring)). The dissent argued that, “[w]ithout some kind of limiting 
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In this light, the Skilling decision has not resolved the many open 
questions regarding the scope of honest services fraud.110  Still, limit-
ing the statute to bribes and kickbacks surely does make it far more 
likely that a potential defendant is on notice of the consequences of 
such unethical actions.111  Also, as the Court has noted, the fair notice 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine ultimately is not the most important 
aspect of the doctrine.112  Although many, if not most, commentators 
tend to focus on the notice provision of the doctrine,113 fair notice 
 
principle, honest services wire fraud could potentially make relatively innocuous 
conduct subject to criminal sanctions.” Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 414 (Fernandez, J., 
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 
2009)). 
 110. In Skilling, the Court referred to United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d 
Cir. 2003), as a “leading” honest services case. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2896, 2929 (2010).  The Second Circuit in Rybicki rejected a vagueness challenge to § 
1346.  The Rybicki dissent, however, responded by noting the myriad ways in which 
the statute remains unclear. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 162–63 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).  For a more detailed discussion of Rybicki, see 
STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 87. 
 111. See Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 259 (citing the Weyhrauch case 
and noting that, since the defendant’s actions violated ethical rules but not state law, 
it would be difficult for a defendant to be on notice that his actions constituted a fed-
eral felony). 
 112. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (“[A]lthough the doc-
trine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have 
recognized recently that the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not ac-
tual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’”) (citation omit-
ted).  Many consider the fair warning prong actually to be something of a myth.  See 
Jeffries, supra note 91, at 210 (“[T]he continuing strength of ‘ignorance of the law is 
no excuse’ is telling evidence of the abstracted and artificial character of the rhetoric 
of ‘fair warning.’”).  The Court has stated, in any event, that “[v]agueness may invali-
date a criminal law for either of [the] two independent reasons.” Chicago v. Morales, 
527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). 
 113. This Article does not undertake an exploration of the complicated, and unset-
tled, law of facial versus as-applied statutory challenges.  As others have noted, the 
Court applies the distinction in inconsistent, result-driven ways. See, e.g., Beale, 
Honest Services, supra note 65, at 257 (the Court “hasn’t articulated a clear standard 
for when it will permit facial challenges and its decisions have been inconsistent”); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
915, 964 (2011) (“With the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges being 
less fundamental than courts and commentators have often assumed, it should occa-
sion no surprise that the Supreme Court does not always labor self-consciously to 
draw that distinction . . . .”); David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the 
Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 
690 (2008) (“[S]everal of the Roberts Court’s decisions adopt the language of the as-
applied model even as their reasoning pursues the logic of the facial model.”); Alex 
Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 657, 665 (2010) (“[N]o single consideration governed the use of facial chal-
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does not require actual notice or understanding, just the potential for 
notice.  And in construing statutes for this purpose, courts generally 
take judicial interpretations of statutes into account.114  Under these 
standards, in a substantial majority of honest services cases, the de-
fendants almost certainly knew that their actions were unethical and 
potentially unlawful. 
Far more significant, though, is the potential that a vague statute 
will lead prosecutors to stretch laws in ways in which they have never 
before been used,115 often for improper reasons such as career en-
hancement or political bias.116  As Professor Jeffries has written, the 
“rule of law” is the grounding principle of the vagueness doctrine.  
The rule of law in the enforcement of criminal laws seeks to limit “ca-
price and whim, the misuse of government power for private ends, 
and the unacknowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection.  
The goals to be advanced are regularity and evenhandedness in the 
administration of justice and accountability in the use of government 
power.”117 
It is difficult to deny that the honest services statute, pre-Skilling, 
was subject to the “caprice and whim” of federal prosecutors.  Alt-
hough uncertainties exist concerning post-Skilling honest services 
fraud, they are certainly fewer, and less complex, than those under 
the previous incarnation of honest services fraud. 
There is one significant caveat to this conclusion, however.  Federal 
prosecutors, in search of ways to resurrect honest services charges 
post-Skilling, may be tempted to try to stretch the mail and wire fraud 
 
lenges, which . . . involves a mixture of substantive constitutional law, institutional 
competence and statutory interpretation.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 258 (“[H]ow can a statute 
be unconstitutionally vague on its face when the text plus the relevant case law pro-
vide adequate notice to many defendants of the prohibited conduct and accompany-
ing penalties?”). 
 115. See Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 3, at 49–52.  
 116. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States 
Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 386 (2009) [hereinafter Beale, Rethinking] 
(“The criticism of the Siegelman prosecution generally focuses on . . . a claim that 
Siegelman was targeted by the Bush White House and U.S. Attorney’s Office be-
cause he was a successful Democratic politician . . . .”). 
 117. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 212–13; see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 352 (a statute 
is unconstitutionally vague when it “vests virtually complete discretion in the hands 
of police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute”).  For an analysis 
of the breadth of the honest services statute, see Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a 
Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 933, 956–57 (2009). 
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statutes in other ways.118  It is the nature of prosecutorial power that 
those who make charging decisions will attempt to take criminal stat-
utes to their limits.119  Thus, if a federal prosecutor has determined 
that a particular individual merits prosecution, then the prosecutor is 
likely to try to find a law to fit the person.  In the absence of an hon-
est services theory or other applicable statute, however, what is a 
prosecutor to do? 
Unfortunately for those looking for predictability in the enforce-
ment of criminal law, the Supreme Court has left the door open for 
another theory.  In perhaps its most important post-McNally, pre-
Skilling mail/wire fraud case, Carpenter v. United States, the Court 
adopted an expansive version of property rights that creative prosecu-
tors may be able to use to fill the void left by Skilling.120  Although the 
Court held in McNally that a mail or wire case may not be based upon 
the “intangible” right to honest services, the Court held in Carpenter 
that such a case may be based upon “intangible” property rights.  In 
that case, the right at issue was a newspaper’s right to the confidenti-
ality and exclusive use of information gathered by its reporters.121 
The problem with the Carpenter decision is that, even more than 
with Skilling, the Court left the boundaries of its rule unclear.  The 
Court never defined the nature or source of the duties that employees 
owe employers that might give right to “intangible” property rights.122  
As Professor John Coffee has noted, the decision potentially criminal-
ized all breaches of fiduciary duties owed by employees to employ-
 
 118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2008). 
 119. See Beale, Rethinking, supra note 116, at 438 (“In the case of the more amor-
phous argument that a state or local official deprived the citizens of his or her honest 
services, however, the prosecutor is not merely assessing the strength of the evidence, 
but in many cases is also seeking to expand the definition of the conduct that consti-
tutes a crime.”); Eliason, supra note 117, at 972–73; Strader, White Collar Crime, su-
pra note 3, at 52. 
 120. 484 U.S. 19, 26–28 (1987). 
 121. In Carpenter, a Wall Street Journal reporter wrote a regular financial column 
that often affected stock prices. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 19–20 
(1987).  The reporter and his co-conspirators traded on stocks discussed in the col-
umn before the column was published, reaping substantial profits and violating the 
terms of the reporter’s employment agreement. Id.  
 122. See John C. Coffee Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Infor-
mation After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of 
Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (1988) (arguing that the deci-
sion is “(a) historically unsound, (b) inconsistent with most statutory law dealing with 
the subject of trade secrets, and (c) capable of trivializing the Court=s decision only 
months earlier in McNally v. United States, which clearly sought to cut back on the 
amoeba-like growth of the mail and wire fraud statutes”).  
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ers.123  In addition, Carpenter allowed federal prosecutors to bring 
cases that would ordinarily be left to state civil and criminal law.124 
We can already see the ricochet effect that Skilling will have on 
cases where prosecutors seek to overcome Skilling’s holding by crea-
tively defining deprivations of “intangible” property rights.  This de-
velopment will simply require the courts to be vigilant in restricting 
prosecutors’ attempts to expand the definition of property under the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.125 
D. The Court in Skilling Properly Declined to Engage in a More 
Detailed Rewriting of the Honest Services Statute 
One criticism of Skilling is that it did not address the underlying 
theoretical and conceptual challenges of the federal law of honest 
services fraud.126  There are many such challenges, but several stand 
out: In the case of an omission to disclose a bribe or kickback, must 
the defendant owe a fiduciary duty to the victim?  If so, to what body 
of law do we look to ascertain the presence of such a duty?127  In the 
case of a private sector defendant, must the victim be deprived on 
some sort of tangible harm?  If so, what sorts of harm qualify?128 
But to respond to these questions in a meaningful way, the Court 
would have had to undertake a far more drastic rewriting of the hon-
est services statute than it did. .  This process would necessarily have 
involved describing the reaches of duties giving rise to fraud charges, 
among other issues.  Further, the Court would have been required to 
define the terms “bribe” and “kickback” in the context of a case that 
involved neither.129  Does the definition of bribery under the federal 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 79–80.  The Court did later 
attempt to limit the definition of “property” to traditional property rights, holding in 
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000), that unissued permits or licenses 
are not “property” under § 1341. See id. at 81.  The pending legislation, reproduced in 
the Appendix, would reverse this decision. See infra pp. 339–41. 
 125. See Beale, Rethinking, supra note 116, at 438. 
 126. Buell, supra note 4, at 43. 
 127. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2938–39 (2010) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). 
 128. See Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); James Lockhart, Validity, 
Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346, Providing that, for Purposes of 
Some Federal Criminal Statutes, Term “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud” Includes 
Scheme or Artifice to Deprive Another of Intangible Right to Honest Services, 172 
A.L.R. FED. 109 (2001). 
 129. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring); Buell, supra note 4, at 
45 (“Supreme Court opinions, of course, almost always open up new issues and fail to 
resolve old ones. The more serious deficit in the Skilling opinion is the missed oppor-
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bribery law apply, thus requiring a quid pro quo?  Some even argue 
that the Court should have used the opportunity to provide us with a 
black letter exegesis on the very nature of fraud itself.130  But for the 
Court to have undertaken this task would have been unprecedented 
and probably beyond the Court’s capacity. 
It is true that the Court has expounded upon certain forms of 
fraud, such as securities fraud, in attempts to clarify particular theo-
ries of such fraud.131  Using insider trading as an example, courts have 
long held that corporate insiders who possess material non-public in-
formation must either disclose that information or abstain from trad-
ing.132  The theoretical basis for such fraud is the insider’s breach of 
duty, when engaging in such self-dealing, to the corporation and its 
shareholders.133  But what if the information is stolen not by a corpo-
rate insider, but instead by a lawyer who is working on a client’s ac-
quisition of a target company and who trades in the target company’s 
stock?  That lawyer is not a corporate insider of the target company, 
and so the traditional rule of insider trading does not apply.134 
Resolving a circuit split and much uncertainty over this issue, the 
Court held in United States v. O’Hagan that the lawyer’s breach of 
fiduciary duty to the firm and the firm’s client— parties that expected 
the information to be kept confidential—is actionable as securities 
fraud under the “misappropriation” theory.135  Although subject to 
substantial criticism because of its own definitional problems,136 this 
theory has developed in the context of a substantial body of case law 
that does, arguably, fairly define its boundaries.  The federal law of 
fraud in general, and the post-Skilling law of honest services fraud in 
particular, can similarly be left to the sort of natural evolution that se-
curities fraud has undergone. 
 
tunity to grapple seriously with the relationship and context problem in the law of 
fraud.”). 
 130. See Buell, supra note 4, at 45.  
 131. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 643. 
 134. Id. at 653 n.5. 
 135. Id. at 647. 
 136. See David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropria-
tion Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 80 (1998) (“By injecting un-
clear notions of unfairness into the federal securities laws, the misappropriation theo-
ry fails to provide a clear or rational standard.”); Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and 
Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1120–21 (1997) (noting that the 
boundaries of the theory are unclear).  
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And there is an additional cautionary tale here.  The Court in 
O’Hagan would have been well within its bounds to reject the misap-
propriation theory, as the dissent argued so vehemently that it should 
have done.137  This would have left the hard work of defining this 
prosecutorially-created and judicially-sanctioned crime—the misap-
propriation theory appears nowhere in the securities fraud statutes—
to Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission.138  But as-
suming the Court appropriately endorsed the misappropriation theo-
ry, it also made sense for the Court not to attempt to define the outer 
boundaries of that theory, but to leave the task to lower courts when 
applying particular sets of facts.  Likewise, it was reasonable for the 
Court to remand the Skilling companion cases—Weyhrauch and 
Black—without deciding the important issues that those cases raised.  
If the cases turned out, on remand, not to be viable because Skilling’s 
holding, then the Court would have been overstepping its bounds to 
reach those issues.139 
III.  THE COURT’S OPTIONS IN SKILLING 
As discussed above, the Skilling decision leaves many questions 
unanswered, but the decision does make the reach of honest services 
fraud more certain.140  In broader terms, what lessons can we glean 
from Skilling’s approach to the task of interpreting complex criminal 
laws?  Given the inevitability of the judicial construction of penal 
statutes, are there governing principles that courts usually employ, or 
should employ, when construing ambiguous statutes?  Many com-
mentators have attempted to provide guidelines,141 but for present 
 
 137. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 680. 
 138. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 108–09.  
 139. United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386, 394 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Weyhrauch, 623 F. 3d 707, 708 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 140. As Professor Jeffries has written, “a judge confronting ambiguity in a penal 
statute might usefully ask whether a proposed resolution makes the law more or less 
certain.”  Jeffries, supra note 91, at 220. 
 141. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2002) (positing a “Preference-Estimating” theory, which 
argues that courts should interpret statutes to match what Congress would enact in 
the current legislative environment); William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415 (1991) (positing a 
“Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” theory, which argues that courts should interpret 
statutes in conformity with social changes); John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2486 (2003) (arguing in favor of textualism, which requires 
that judges enforce the plain meaning of the statute, even if it leads to absurd results); 
see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
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purposes the focus is on the practical realities that the Court faced in 
Skilling. 
Given the attacks the Court took from all sides, what were the 
Court’s options in the case?  There appear to have been four obvious 
courses of action: (1) do nothing, and leave the uncertainty over hon-
est services fraud in place;142 (2) invalidate the entire statute, leading 
almost inevitably to a Congressional response that would, given Con-
gress’s track record, make matters worse;143 (3) undertake a complete 
reworking of mail fraud and honest services fraud, a task the Court is 
ill-equipped to undertake and has rarely, if ever, successfully under-
taken in analogous circumstances; or (4) attempt to provide some 
clarity to the statute by narrowing its focus, which is what the bribery 
and kickback limitation arguably does.  It is not irrational to conclude 
that the fourth option was the best, or least bad, alternative.  Despite 
what some have claimed, the honest services statute pre-Skilling was 
truly ambiguous.144  Indeed, many would argue that the Court’s job is 
to clarify such ambiguity.145  A pragmatic approach to the problem is, 
in this context, largely defensible. 
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the Skilling majority opinion, appears 
to be, at heart, a pragmatist when confronted with complex federal 
criminal law issues.  Her majority opinion in O’Hagan, for example, 
upheld the misappropriation theory on practical grounds, finding the 
theory necessary to safeguard confidence in the fairness of the securi-
ties markets.146  The Court reached this conclusion without defining 
the boundaries of the fiduciary duty that a misappropriating party 
must owe to a wronged party, leaving it to the SEC and the lower 
courts to define these boundaries.147 
 
REV. 505, 565 (2001) (describing the role of courts in filling in the content of criminal 
statutes). 
 142. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting the confusion among circuit courts). 
 143. See infra pp. 339–41. 
 144. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissent-
ing).   
 145. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 207 (“Facial uncertainty may be cured by judicial 
construction.  Indeed, judicial specification will be accepted as sufficient even where 
it amounts to a wholesale rewriting of the statutory text.”). 
 146. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). 
 147. In 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, entitled ‘‘Duties of trust or confidence 
in misappropriation insider trading cases,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2, in an attempt to 
provide some clarity to this theory. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, 
at 112–13.  Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg also wrote the unanimous decision in 
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), which narrowly construed the defini-
tion of property under the mail and wire fraud statutes.  Although not explicit in her 
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Even more telling, perhaps, was Justice Ginsburg’s vote in United 
States v. Booker.148  In that case, the five-member majority held that a 
sentence enhancement based on the judge’s determination of a fact—
other than a prior conviction, not found by the jury or admitted by 
the defendant—violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.149  A separate five-member majority held that the appropri-
ate remedy for this violation is not to require that the jury determine 
all the relevant facts.150  Instead, this opinion held, the Sixth Amend-
ment infirmity could be cured by holding that the federal sentencing 
guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory.151  Justice Ginsburg, 
who did not write an opinion in Booker, provided the swing vote, sid-
ing with both the majority merits opinion152 and the remedial deci-
sion.153  She was the only member of the merits majority to join in the 
remedial opinion.154  The result was very pragmatic; instead of a com-
plex and potentially cumbersome system requiring that juries engage 
sentencing-related fact-finding, Booker’s effect is to follow the exist-
ing system of judicial fact-finding while allowing trial judges some dis-
cretion under the now-advisory guidelines scheme.155  The Court—
perhaps unanimously—may well have also concluded that this practi-
cal solution would be preferable to an attempt by Congress to remedy 
the situation. 
The result in Skilling was similarly pragmatic—to confine prosecu-
tors’ discretion in honest services cases, while also providing far more 
notice to potential defendants of the statute’s reach.  Presumably, the 
Skilling majority also hoped that this approach would assuage Con-
gress from responding with a revised and expanded honest services 
statute; the Court’s footnote outlining the challenges in constructing 
such a statute supports this conclusion.156  As the next Part shows, 
 
Skilling opinion, overfederalization seems to be a serious concern for Justice Gins-
burg, who wrote in Cleveland that the Court would reject a “sweeping expansion of 
federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress.”  Cleve-
land v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000). 
 148. 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005). 
 149. Id. at 244. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 245. 
 152. Id. at 225. 
 153. Id. at 244. 
 154. Id. at 225 (Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg in the mer-
its opinion; Justices Breyer, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg in the 
remedial opinion). 
 155. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 390. 
 156. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.44 (2010). 
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however, the Court may have overestimated Congress’s willingness to 
cede power to the Court in defining the scope of federal criminal 
law.157 
IV.  THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO SKILLING 
In 2010 and 2011, Congress quickly took up the challenge that Skil-
ling posed.158  In fact, in the “Clean Up Government Act of 2011,” 
under consideration as this Article goes to press, Congress takes aim 
not just at Skilling, but also at a number of judicial decisions that at-
tempted to clarify the scope of federal anti-corruption statutes.159  
Among other things, the bill would overturn the Supreme Court’s de-
cision limiting the scope of the federal gratuities statutes,160 the Su-
preme Court’s decision limiting the definition of “property” under the 
mail and wire fraud statutes,161 and the D.C. Circuit’s decision limit-
ing the scope of the federal bribery statute.162  The bill would also 
vastly expand federal jurisdiction over state and local bribery cases by 
lowering the amount required for federal program bribery from $5000 
to $1000163 and by adding this crime as a RICO predicate.164  And just 
in case we did not get the message that Congress is really, really tough 
on crime, the bill expands venue provisions for certain offenses,165 in-
creases the limitations period for bringing certain charges,166 and ex-
pands certain sentences, sometimes dramatically.167  A student of the 
judicial-legislative dynamic in the adoption and construction of penal 
statutes could well write a treatise based solely on this proposed legis-
lation. 
For present purposes, the honest services provision merits close 
examination.  The proposed honest services amendment, to be codi-
 
 157. See infra Part IV. 
 158. Leahy Introduces Bill To Address Supreme Court’s Skilling Decision, Fed. 
Info. & News Dispatch, Sept. 28, 2010, available at WLNR 19343461. 
 159. Clean Up Government Act of 2011, H.R. 2572, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 160. Id. § 8; see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 
414 (1999) (requiring connection between the gratuity received and performance of a 
specific past, present, or future “official” act). 
 161. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 2; see also Cleveland v. United States, 
531 U.S. 12 (2000) (holding that unissued licenses do not constitute property). 
 162. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 9; see also Valdes v. United States, 475 
F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (limiting the definition of an official act).  
 163. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 4. 
 164. Id. § 13. 
 165. Id. §§ 3, 15. 
 166. Id. § 11. 
 167. Id. §§ 4, 5, 11. 
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fied as Section 1346A of the federal criminal code, is entitled “Undis-
closed self-dealing by public officials.”168  The bill states: “For pur-
poses of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ also in-
cludes a scheme or artifice by a public official to engage in 
undisclosed self-dealing.”169  The bill further defines the term “undis-
closed self-dealing”170 in ways that appear to respond to the Court’s 
preemptive challenge to such a law in Skilling.171 
This proposed legislation truly seems to be a knee-jerk response to 
courts’ attempts to (1) provide clarity to criminal statutes, (2) reign in 
the rush to overcriminalization, and (3) reign in the rush to 
overfederalization.  It seems that Congress has reached the point 
where any judicial limitation on federal criminal laws is seen as a 
power grab by courts that needs a slapping down.  A critic of these 
trends could see this bill as the culmination of everything wrong with 
criminalization in the current environment. 
Take a few examples from the bill.  The law would penalize “a pub-
lic official [who] performs an official act for the purpose, in whole or 
in material part, of furthering or benefitting a financial interest of . . . 
an individual, business, or organization with whom the public official 
is negotiating for, or has any arrangement concerning, prospective 
 
 168. Id. § 16(a). 
 169. Id. 
 170. The bill defines undisclosed self-dealing as follows: 
(A) a public official performs an official act for the purpose, in whole or in 
material part, of furthering or benefitting a financial interest of— 
(i) the public official; 
(ii) the spouse or minor child of a public official; 
(iii) a general business partner of the public official; 
(iv) a business or organization in which the public official is serving as an 
employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner; 
(v) an individual, business, or organization with whom the public official is 
negotiating for, or has any arrangement concerning, prospective employ-
ment or financial compensation; or 
(vi) an individual, business, or organization from whom the public official 
has received any thing or things of value, otherwise than as provided by law 
for the proper discharge of official duty, or by rule or regulation; and 
(B) the public official knowingly falsifies, conceals, or covers up material in-
formation that is required to be disclosed by any Federal, State, or local 
statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public official, or the 
knowing failure of the public official to disclose material information in a 
manner that is required by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regula-
tion, or charter applicable to the public official. 
Id. 
 171. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.45 (2010). 
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employment or financial compensation.”172  What does it mean to 
have “any arrangement?”  The bill does not say.  The bill also covers 
“an individual, business, or organization from whom the public offi-
cial has received any thing or things of value.”173  How far does this 
reach?  Would it, as the Court posited in Sun-Diamond Growers in 
connection with the federal gratuities statute, “criminalize a high 
school principal’s gift of a school baseball cap to [a public official], by 
reason of his office, on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the 
school?”174 
Most importantly, what would be the practical impact of criminaliz-
ing the failure to “disclose material information in a manner that is 
required by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or 
charter applicable to the public official?”175  On its face, this bill 
would provide disparate outcomes depending purely on the location 
of the alleged crime; acts that would be criminal in one locality, for 
example, would not be criminal in an adjacent locality with different 
disclosure laws.  And this is not minor criminal liability; the statute 
provides for a twenty-year prison sentence.176 
To return to the scenario at the beginning of this Article, the local 
official appears, on the face of the matter, to have possibly threatened 
to hold up a project unless the developer paid the official’s wife for 
work she had previously done for an overseas affiliate of the develop-
er on an unrelated matter.  Yes, this looks suspicious on its face.  But 
should it really be a federal crime meriting a sentence of up to twenty 
years?177  And if a neighboring state had no such disclosure law, 
would it be fair or appropriate to criminalize this act? 
The question is whether the scope of the honest services statute, 
post-Skilling, so hampers anti-corruption efforts that a replacement 
honest services statute is necessary.  The real question, in this context, 
is whether a broad range of public conflicts of interest needs to be 
criminalized and federalized.  Where the scheme involves an intended 
deprivation of money or property, we are within the realm of tradi-
tional fraud,178 though the intangible property rights door opened by 
 
 172. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 16(a). 
 173. Id. 
 174. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999). 
 175. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 16(a). 
 176. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008).  Of course, the particular 
sentence would depend upon the application of the U.S. sentencing guidelines to the 
particular case. 
 177. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 6.  
 178. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356–57 (2008). 
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Carpenter invites mischief in defining property rights.179  But it is tru-
ly difficult to conceive of an honest services statute that would not 
lead to the real danger underlying vague crimes, which invite prosecu-
tors to expand criminal statutes and target individuals unguided by 
the terms of the underlying statutes.180 
CONCLUSION 
The courts have not proved to be an effective bulwark against 
over-reaching criminal statutes.  After all, it took the Court over 
twenty years to limit the scope of the honest services statute;181 it is 
difficult to determine the harm—the lives and careers affected, the 
millions of dollars in legal fees spent—wrought during that time by a 
statute that created an indefinable offense.  Congress now faces a 
choice: enact a broad honest services statute that similarly invites law 
enforcement abuse, or leave in place a narrower construction of the 
existing statute that will leave to state and local authorities the pursuit 
of those operating at the margins of federal law.182  If attempts to res-
urrect a broad-reaching form of honest services fraud succeed, then 
we can all watch to see if the courts are up to the task of applying 
constitutional limitations to that new offense. 
  
 
 179. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding that intangible prop-
erty rights are sufficient).  As noted above, even the fairly narrow limitation that the 
Court imposed in Cleveland, that unissued licenses are not property interests, would 
be removed by the proposed Congressional response to Skilling. See infra pp. 339–41. 
 180. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 223 (“[T]he result [of vague criminal statutes] is that 
lawmaking devolves to law enforcement, and police and prosecutors are invited to 
play too large a role in deciding what to punish.”). 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). 
 182. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 218 n.81 (“[T]he choice would be between upholding 
the statute, in the certain knowledge that it invites abusive enforcement, or striking 
the statute at some cost to the effectiveness of legitimate law enforcement.”). 
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APPENDIX 
United States Library of Congress 
HR 2572 
Introduced in House 
July 15, 2011 
To amend title 18, United States Code, to deter public corruption, 
and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
July 15, 2011 
Mr. Sensenbrenner (for himself and Mr. Quigley) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
To amend title 18, United States Code, to deter public corruption, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘Clean Up Government Act of 2011’. 
* * * 
SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON UNDISCLOSED SELF-DEALING 
BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS. 
(a) In General. Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amend-
ed by inserting after section 1346 the following new section: 
‘Sec. 1346A. Undisclosed self-dealing by public officials 
‘(a) Undisclosed Self-Dealing by Public Officials. For purposes of this 
chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ also includes a 
scheme or artifice by a public official to engage in undisclosed self-
dealing. 
‘(b) Definitions. As used in this section: 
‘(1) Official act. The term ‘official act’— 
‘(A) includes any act within the range of official duty, and any deci-
sion, recommendation, or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, 
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proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or 
which may by law be brought before any public official, in such public 
official’s official capacity or in such official’s place of trust or profit; 
‘(B) may be a single act, more than one act, or a course of conduct; 
and 
‘(C) includes a decision or recommendation that a government 
should not take action. 
‘(2) Public official. The term ‘public official’ means an officer, em-
ployee, or elected or appointed representative, or person acting for or 
on behalf of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State, or 
any department, agency or branch of government thereof, in any offi-
cial function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, 
or branch of government. 
‘(3) State. The term ‘State’ includes a State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession 
of the United States. 
‘(4) Undisclosed self-dealing. The term ‘undisclosed self-dealing’ 
means that— 
‘(A) a public official performs an official act for the purpose, in 
whole or in material part, of furthering or benefitting a financial in-
terest of— 
 ‘(i) the public official; 
 ‘(ii) the spouse or minor child of a public official; 
 ‘(iii) a general business partner of the public official; 
 ‘(iv) a business or organization in which the public official is 
serving as an employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner; 
 ‘(v) an individual, business, or organization with whom the 
public official is negotiating for, or has any arrangement concerning, 
prospective employment or financial compensation; or 
 ‘(vi) an individual, business, or organization from whom the 
public official has received any thing or things of value, otherwise 
than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, or by 
rule or regulation; and 
‘(B) the public official knowingly falsifies, conceals, or covers up 
material information that is required to be disclosed by any Federal, 
State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the 
public official, or the knowing failure of the public official to disclose 
material information in a manner that is required by any Federal, 
State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the 
public official. 
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‘(5) Material information. The term ‘material information’ includes 
information— 
‘(A) regarding a financial interest of a person described in clauses 
(i) through (iv) paragraph (4)(A); and 
‘(B) regarding the association, connection, or dealings by a public 
official with an individual, business, or organization as described in 
clauses (iii) through (vi) of paragraph 4.’. 
(b) Conforming Amendment. The table of sections for chapter 63 of 
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 1346 the following new item: 
‘1346A. Undisclosed self-dealing by public officials.’. 
(c) Applicability. The amendments made by this section apply to acts 
engaged in on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
